

Message Text

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00364 01 OF 04 311946Z

51

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-08 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AECE-00 INRE-00 SSO-00

NSCE-00 USIE-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-04 L-01

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0551

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0364

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY OF TEXT TO NATO DEPT, TURKISH FOREIGN
MINISTRY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: USSR PRESENTATION AT OCT 31
PLENARY SESSION

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT THE OCT 31 PLENARY MEETING OF THE
MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, CHAIRED BY CZECHOSLOVAK REP (KLEIN),
STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY THE SOVIET REP (KHLESTOV) AND BY
THE US REP.

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00364 01 OF 04 311946Z

2. IN HIS STATEMENT, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE FOUR PACT

DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, SOVIET REP KHLESTOV INTRODUCED THE EASTERN INITIAL REDUCTIONS STEP IN EXACTLY THE SAME TERMS AS PRESENTED BY EASTERN REPS AT THE OCT 15 INFORMAL MEETING. HE SAID THAT A FIRST STEP APPROACH WAS NECESSARY TO BREAK THE ICE IN VIENNA AFTER A YEAR OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL SOUGHT TO TAKE WESTERN INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT. KHLESTOV SAID EACH SOVEREIGN STATE PARTICIPANT IN AN AGREEMENT HAD THE OBLIGATION NOT TO EXCEED THOSE LEVELS OF FORCES AGREED TO, THAT MILITARY ALLIANCES COULD NOT UNDERTAKE SUCH OBLIGATIONS AND THAT "COMMON CEILINGS" COULD NOT BE USED "TO LIFT FROM INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE AGREEMENT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FULFILLING THE OBLIGATIONS ON THE NON-INCREASE OF THE REDUCED LEVELS OF THE NUMBER OF TROOPS."

3. THE STATEMENT BY US REP, AS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP ON OCT 30, NOTED THAT ONE YEAR HAD PASSED SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE WENT ON TO RECALL WESTERN MOVES TO PROMOTE PROGRESS ON THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET, TO REFER GENERALLY TO ALLIED SUGGESTIONS ON GROUND FORCE RE-CATEGORIZATION AND TO CALL ON EASTERN REPS TO DEMONSTRATE IN THEIR PROPOSALS RECOGNITION OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE TEXT OF US REP'S STATEMENT IS BEING TRANSMITTED BY AIRGRAM. END SUMMARY.

4. THE TEXT OF THE SOVIET STATEMENT READS AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN,

COMRADES, GENTELMEN,

1. SPEAKING ON THIS DAY A YEAR AGO, THE SOVIET DELEGATION DECLARED THAT WE HAD COME TO VIENNA WITH THE FIRM INTENTION OF MAKING THE MAXIMUM EFFORT TO GIVE OUR NEGOTIATIONS CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00364 01 OF 04 311946Z

A BUSINESSLIKE AND CONSTRUCTIVE CHARACTER AND TO WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

2. THE SOCIALIST STATES ENTERED THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH A SPECIFIC AND PRACTICALLY REALIZABLE PROGRAMME FOR THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, WHICH WAS SET OUT IN THE JOINT DRAFT AGREEMENT OF 8 NOVEMBER 1973.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS PROGRAMME WOULD ALLOW THE
SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF THE PRESENT HIGH CONCENTRATION
OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

3. THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES CONFIRM IN
ALL RESPECTS WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AGREED
AT THE PREPARATORY TALKS, AND ABOVE ALL WITH THE FUNDA-
MENTAL PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES.

4. THE WHOLE COURSE OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS HAS

REAFFIRMED THE ADVANTAGES OF THE APPROACH ADVANCED BY
THE SOCIALIST STATES, WHICH IS BASED ON A SOBER ASSESS-
MENT OF THE EXISTING REALITIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND
ABOVE ALL OF THE WHOLE BALANCE OF FORCES WHICH HAS COME
INTO BEING THERE.

5. THE SOCIALIST STATES CONSIDER THAT ONLY THE CARRYING
OUT OF GENUINELY MUTUAL AND EQUIVALENT REDUCTIONS OF THE
ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF THE STATES WHICH ARE
PARTICIPANTS IN A FUTURE AGREEMENT WILL REALLY STRENGTHEN
THE SECURITY OF ALL EUROPEAN STATES, WITHOUT GIVING
UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES TO ANYBODY.

6. THE DRAFT AGREEMENT PRESENTED BY THE SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES HAS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OPENED UP BEFORE THE
PARTICIPANTS IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS THE POSSIBILITY OF
REACHING AGREEMENT ON MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE WAYS OF REDUCING
ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT IS,
HOWEVER, QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE THAT ONE MORE ESSENTIAL
CONDITION IS NECESSARY FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF AN UNDER-
STANDING -- THE READINESS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO
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PAGE 04 MBFR V 00364 01 OF 04 311946Z

PARTICIPATE IN THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES, AND TO SHOW
A REALISTIC APPROACH AND ENGAGE IN A SEARCH FOR DECISIONS
WHICH WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE STATES AT THE
CONFERENCE TABLE.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00364 02 OF 04 311959Z

51

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-08 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AECE-00 INRE-00 SSO-00

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0364

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

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7. UNFORTUNATELY IT IS NECESSARY TO STATE THAT THE
WESTERN COUNTRIES CAME TO VIENNA WITH OTHER PURPOSES.
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THOSE COUNTRIES HAVE DECLARED
FROM THE VERY BEGINNING THAT THEY SEE AS THE AIM OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS THE CHANGING OF THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP
OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE -- A CHANGE WHICH WOULD
GIVE UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES TO NATO. THIS WAS
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00364 02 OF 04 311959Z

REFLECTED IN THE PROPOSALS OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES OF
22 NOVEMBER LAST YEAR, WHICH RUN COUNTER TO THE PRINCIPLE
OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES, BOTH AS A WHOLE
AND IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS. THIS POSITION, WHICH

REMAINS THE POSITION OF THE NATO COUNTRIES NOW, CONTINUES TO REMAIN THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

8. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES PROCEED FROM THE FACT THAT THE FINAL RESULT AND AIM OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE AN AGREEMENT ON A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF THE MASSIVE CONCENTRATION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND THAT THIS WOULD ASSIST THE STRENGTHENING OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND GENERAL PEACE.

9. BY CONTRAST, THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS MAINTAIN THAT REDUCTION SHOULD BE CONFINED TO ONLY ONE ELEMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THIS AREA - GROUND FORCES - AND SHOULD LEAD TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EQUAL "COMMON CEILINGS" ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THESE TROOPS OF THE NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES.

10. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE DEMONSTRATED IN THEIR STATEMENTS THAT THE CONCEPT ADVANCED BY THE WEST OF ESTABLISHING "COMMON CEILINGS" IS BASED ON A BIASED ASSESSMENT OF THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES.

11. THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES ARE IN EFFECT TRYING TO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE AGREED SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS -- THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE -- THE REDUCTION OF ONLY ONE TYPE OF ARMED FORCES - GROUND FORCES.

12. THE AIM OF THIS SUBSTITUTION IS EVIDENT: BY MEANS OF CHANGING THE RELATIONSHIP IN GROUND FORCE MAN-POWER TO CHANGE THE OVERALL BALANCE OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF NATO. MOREOVER, THE EXCLUSION FROM THE SCOPE OF REDUCTIONS OF AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD PRESERVE THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING THE COMBAT STRENGTH OF THESE TYPES OF ARMED FORCES.
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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00364 02 OF 04 311959Z

13. ONE CANNOT AVOID DRAWING ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF "COMMON CEILINGS" MEANS IN ITS ESSENCE THE EMPLOYMENT OF A BLOC APPROACH TO THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, A THING TO WHICH THE SOCIALIST STATES, FOR REASONS OF WHICH WE HAVE MORE THAN ONCE SPOKEN, CANNOT AGREE. THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE AGREEMENT FOR THE CONCLUSION OF WHICH WE ARE NEGOTIATING WILL NOT BE MILITARY ALLIANCES -- ALL THE MORE SO BECAUSE THERE IS THE PROSPECT THAT SUCH ALLIANCES MAY BE DISSOLVED -- BUT SOVEREIGN STATES, EACH ONE OF

WHICH MUST ASSUME DEFINITE OBLIGATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE REDUCTION OF ITS FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND BEAR FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CARRYING OUT THESE OBLIGATIONS.

14. ONE OF SUCH OBLIGATIONS OF EACH PARTICIPANT IN AN AGREEMENT MUST BE THE OBLIGATION NOT TO EXCEED THOSE LEVELS OF THE NUMBERS OF ITS ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH WILL HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED AFTER THE AGREEMENTS. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT ITSELF WILL DEPEND ON THE OBSERVANCE OF THIS OBLIGATION BY EACH PARTICIPANT.

15. BY THEIR VERY PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH "COMMON CEILINGS" FOR THE NUMBER OF GROUND TROOPS OF THE COUNTRIES OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE STRIVING TO LIFT FROM INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE AGREEMENT THE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FULFILLING THE OBLIGATIONS ON THE NON-INCREASE OF THE REDUCED LEVELS OF THE NUMBERS OF TROOPS. COVERING THEMSELVES BEHIND THE CONCEPT OF "COMMON CEILINGS," SOME STATES COULD REDUCE THEIR TROOPS WHILE OTHERS, ON THE CONTRARY, COULD INCREASE THEM. THE SOCIALIST STATES CANNOT AGREE TO THIS. WE CONSIDER IT EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT THE OBLIGATIONS OF EACH PARTICIPANT BE PRECISELY FIXED IN THE AGREEMENT ON THE SCORE, IN ORDER TO PREVENT A POSSIBLE FUTURE INCREASE BY INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS OF THE NUMBERS OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

16. IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MUTUALITY OF REDUCTIONS AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF THE SIDES IS
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PAGE 04 MBFR V 00364 02 OF 04 311959Z

THE PROPOSAL OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES THAT THE SOVIET UNION CARRY OUT A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF TROOPS UNDER CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE MAJORITY OF THE NATO COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THOSE HAVING LARGE ARMED FORCES IN THAT AREA, ARE REFUSING TO ASSUME, JOINTLY WITH OTHER STATES, THE OBLIGATION TO

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00364 03 OF 04 312006Z

51

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-08 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AECE-00 INRE-00 SSO-00

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0364

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

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REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES. THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS HAVE
BEEN UNABLE EVEN UP TO THE PRESENT TIME TO ADVANCE ARGUMENTS
WHICH WOULD MAKE THEIR POSITION ON THIS QUESTION CONVINCING,
SINCE THERE ARE NO SUCH ARGUMENTS. THE IMPRESSION IS CREATED
THAT THE REAL MOTIVE UNDERLYING THE POSITION OF SOME OF THE
NATO COUNTRIES PRESENT IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL
REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IS MERELY DESIRE TO
AVOID CLEAR OBLIGATIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF THEIR TROOPS.

17. THESE CRITICAL COMMENTS REGARDING THE WESTERN PROPOSALS
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00364 03 OF 04 312006Z

ARE DICTATED FIRST OF ALL BY OUR DESIRE TO MAKE THE
VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS MORE CONSTRUCTIVE AND TO FIND AN
OBJECTIVE BASIS FOR UNDERSTANDING CORRESPONDING TO THE
AGREED PRINCIPLES OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

COMRADE CHAIRMAN,

18. THE EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE SHOWS THAT THERE ARE DEFINITE DIFFICULTIES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. AS WE HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT, THE PROGRAM OF CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS, WHICH THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE PROPOSED CORRESPONDS IN ALL RESPECTS TO THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, AND ESPECIALLY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF ANY OF THE PARTIES. THEIR REALIZATION WOULD PERMIT CONSIDERABLE REDUCTIONS IN THE NEXT THREE YEARS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS LOCATED IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

19. WE HAVE ALREADY SHOWN THE SERIOUS DEFECTS OF THE WESTERN SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS WHICH IS AIMED AT CHANGING THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WHICH HAS DEVELOPED IN CENTRAL EUROPE. MOREOVER, AS IT FOLLOWS FROM THE EXPLANATIONS MADE BY THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES, THEIR OUTLINE WOULD NOT PROVIDE THE POSSIBILITY OF CONDUCTING SUBSTANTIAL MUTUAL REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THIS REGION EVEN OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS.

20. THEREFORE, THE GENERAL APPROACHES OF THE SIDES TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS REMAIN DIFFERENT, FAR FROM ONE ANOTHER. IN THESE CONDITIONS BOTH SIDES HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE SITUATION WHICH HAS DEVELOPED AND HAVE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO ACHIEVE REAL PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, IF POSSIBLE VERY SOON.

21. IN OUR OPINION, IT WOULD BE USEFUL IN THIS CONNECTION TO WORK ON THE SEARCH FOR AN INITIAL STEP WHICH WOULD PERMIT US TO WORK OUT IN THE GIVEN STAGE A FIRST CONCRETE SOLUTION ON MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND THEREBY MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS OFF THE SPOT AND GIVE THEM A NEW IMPULSE. BY SUCH A STEP, AN UNDERSTANDING
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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00364 03 OF 04 312006Z

COULD BE CONSTITUTED WHICH WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ELEMENTS OF THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES AND FULLY CORRESPOND TO THE MAIN GOAL OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS -- MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

22. PROCEEDING FROM THESE IDEAS AND GUIDED BY A SINCERE DESIRE FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE FIRST CONCRETE RESULTS, THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE DECIDED TO PRESENT A PROPOSAL FOR AN INITIAL STEP OF REDUCTIONS.

23. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE GDR, POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE USSR CONCRETELY PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING:

24. TO CARRY OUT DURING THE YEAR 1974 REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES (U.S., ENGLAND, FRG, BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS, LUXEMBOURG, CANADA) AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES (USSR, POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GDR) BY AN OVERALL NUMBER OF 20,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE WITH CORRESPONDING ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT.

25. IN ADDITION THE ARMED FORCES OF THE US AND THE USSR WOULD BE REDUCED BY TEN THOUSAND MEN AND, FOR INSTANCE, THE FRG AND POLAND - BY FIVE THOUSAND MEN, AND THE REMAINING FIVE THOUSAND FROM EACH SIDE WOULD BE DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE REMAINING STATES.

26. DURING 1975, THE REDUCTION OF TROOPS WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER: THOSE OF THE USSR AND THE US DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE YEAR, AND THE REMAINING COUNTRIES IN THE SECOND HALF YEAR.

27. THE REDUCTIONS PROPOSED FOR 1975 COULD BE GIVEN THE SHAPE OF AN INITIAL STEP BY A SEPARATE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR AN OBLIGATION BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS ON A FURTHER, MORE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

28. WE WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT THIS PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST STATES, AS WELL AS THE AGREEMENT WORKED OUT
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PAGE 04 MBFR V 00364 03 OF 04 312006Z

ON THE BASIS OF IT, MUST NOT INFRINGE ON THE POSITIONS OF PRINCIPLE OF BOTH SIDES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS NOR CREATE A PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE, MORE FAR-RACHING REDUCTIONS.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00364 04 OF 04 312014Z

51
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-08 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AECE-00 INRE-00 SSO-00

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0364

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29. THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST STATES CONTAINS A
SERIES OF ELEMENTS WHICH TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE
DESIRES AND IDEAS OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS.

30. WE HAVE CONSIDERED AND CONTINUE TO CONSIDER THAT
ALL COUNTRIES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE
NEGOTIATIONS MUST PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE VERY
OUTSET. NEVERTHELESS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DESIRE
OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, IT IS PROVIDED IN THE INITIAL
STEP PROPOSAL THAT THE US AND USSR ENGAGE FIRST IN THE
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00364 04 OF 04 312014Z

REDUCTIONS.

31. ANOTHER DESIRE OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES HAS BEEN
TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. THE REMAINING STATES WHICH
ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL ENGAGE
IN REDUCTIONS AFTER THE USSR AND THE US COMPLETE THE
INITIAL STEP OF REDUCTION PROVIDED.

32. THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE PROPOSED TO DISTRIBUTE
THE DIMENSIONS OF THE REDUCTIONS FOR THE YEAR 1975 IN

PROPORTION TO THE QUANTITY OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS
OF EACH OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WHICH IT POSSESSES
IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

33. NOW, WITH CONSIDERATION FOR THE WISHES OF THE
WESTERN DELEGATIONS, THE MAIN SHARE OF THE REDUCTIONS
IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL FOR AN INITIAL STEP
WILL FALL ON THE USSR AND THE US. THE SCOPE OF THE
REDUCTIONS OF EACH OF THESE TWO STATES WILL CONSIDERABLY
EXCEED THE REDUCTIONS OF ANY OTHER STATE ON EITHER SIDE.
AS A RESULT, THE SCOPE OF REDUCTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES
OF SOME DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE
WESTERN SIDE ARE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED IN COMPARISON
WITH WHAT WAS ENVISAGED IN OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT FOR A
FIRST STAGE OF REDUCTIONS.

34. THE NEW PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST STATES ASSURES
AN OUTCOME TO THE QUESTION WHICH WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING
IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SINCE FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR, NAMELY
WHOSE FORCES MUST BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. WE HAVE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN SIDE ON THIS QUESTION
AND HAVE STIPULATED A SEPARATION OF THE PERIODS OF
REDUCTION OF THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN TROOPS FROM THE
PERIODS OF REDUCTION OF THE TROOPS OF THE OTHER DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. SEVERAL OTHER ELEMENTS
OF THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE ALSO BEEN
TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN THE PROPOSAL.

35. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT REDUCTIONS BY EQUAL AMOUNTS --
BY 20,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE -- WOULD GIVE UNILATERAL
MILITARY ADVANTAGES TO NO ONE. MOREOVER, INASMUCH AS
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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00364 04 OF 04 312014Z

THE MEASURES ON MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND
ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH ARE PROVIDED FOR IN
THE NEW PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST STATES ARE RELATIVELY
SMALL, THEY WILL BE EASIER TO ACCOMPLISH.

36. THE CONCLUSION OF AN INITIAL AGREEMENT ON REDUCTION
BY THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD
TESTIFY TO THEIR DETERMINATION TO PASS FROM WORDS TO
ACTIONS AND WOULD BE TAKEN BY WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AS A
SIGN THAT THE ICE HAS BEEN BROKEN AT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS.
EVEN A REDUCTION WHICH IS RELATIVELY SMALL IN ITSELF WOULD
FURTHER THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE GENERAL ATMOSPHERE ON THE
EUROPEAN CONTINENT, AND WOULD STRENGTHEN THE CLIMATE OF
MUTUAL TRUST IN RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES PARTICIPATING IN
THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH IS SO IMPORTANT FOR THE FRUITFUL
CONDUCT OF FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON A MORE CONSIDERABLE
REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

IT WOULD BE A CONVINCING DISPLAY OF THE READINESS OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO MOVE ALONG THE ROAD OF MILITARY DETENTE IN EUROPE.

37. IN ADDITION, SUCH AN INITIAL STEP WOULD OPEN THE WAY TO FURTHER, MORE SUBSTANTIAL STEPS ON MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WHICH WE WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK OUT. THE FACT THAT WE ARE READY -- ON THE BASIS OF MUTUALITY, OF COURSE -- TO PROCEED IN THE COMING YEARS TO A FURTHER, AND MOREOVER SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, IS EVIDENT IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST STATES.

38. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PROPOSAL ADVANCED IN THE NAME OF THE GDR, POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND THE USSR PROVIDES THE POSSIBILITY TO ACHIEVE THE FIRST PRACTICAL RESULTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE IF, OF COURSE, ALL STATES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS DISPLAY A DIESIRE TO SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS AND A READINESS FOR CONCRETE ACTIONS.RESOR

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From: MBFR VIENNA
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